Unconventional monetary policy is often assumed to benefit banks. However, we find little supporting evidence. Rather, we find some evidence for heightened medium-term risks. In an event study using a novel instrument for monetary policy surprises, we do not detect clear effects of monetary easing on bank stock valuation but find a deterioration of medium-term bank credit risk in the United States, the euro area, and the United Kingdom. However, these risks are essentially the same as conventional monetary easing in pre-crisis years.
I. INTRODUCTION
To combat the financial turmoil and subsequent "Great Recession", major advanced countries have adopted unconventional monetary policies: keeping the policy rate near zero, attempting to manage expectations actively (forward guidance), expanding central banks' balance sheets by purchasing long-term government bonds and risky assets, and introducing schemes to facilitate bank lending. 2 In particular, when the financial market faced acute dysfunction, central banks' actions prevented banks, and the economy at large, from falling into a "bad" equilibrium or debt-deflation spiral (for a review, see for example, IMF, 2013a).
In theory, even after the acute phase of the crisis ended, unconventional monetary policies may benefit banks. In the short run, banks engaging in maturity transformation should gain from low short-term rates as long as the long-term rates remain relatively stable. Similarly, banks can gain from borrowing at low cost and investing in assets delivering higher returns provided that policies do not depress the returns on those assets as well. Moreover, banks may take advantage of any reduction in term premia to replace short-term debt with longterm debt and reduce the risk of maturity mismatches in their balance sheets (Stein, 2012) .
However, in the medium term, too easy monetary policies may hurt banks. The boost in spread income wanes as unconventional policies flatten the yield curve and reduce the risk premia. Consequently, banks may rationally take extra leverage and risk (Borio and Zhu, 2008 ). This negative relationship between short-term interest rates and risk-taking is strengthened in a model of financial intermediation where banks, operating under limited liability and asymmetric information, can engage in costly monitoring to reduce the credit risk in their loan portfolios, and endogenously modify their capital structure in response to a monetary policy change (Allen and Gale, 2004, and Marquez, 2010) . Under limited liability, a policy change that decreases banks' profits, as unconventional monetary policies do to a limited extent, reduces the franchise value of banks and hence the incentive for monitoring the borrowers and investing prudently. A policy rate cut also reduces the incentive for banks to finance themselves with equity as a commitment device to prevent excessive risk-taking and decreases the cost of debt and deposits, so that leverage increases. Also, with low interest rates, banks may prefer to roll over loans to nonviable firms rather than declaring them non-performing and registering a loss in their income statement. Previous studies have found evidence of such "evergreening" policies in Japan in the 1990s and 2000s (Peek and Rosengren, 2003; Caballero, Hoshi and Kashyap, 2008) .
The overall effect of unconventional monetary policies on banks' profitability and risk is thus theoretically unclear. Both the benefits and costs, however, should be reflected in the changes We find that bank credit risk increases with monetary easing over the medium term without clear effects on bank stock valuation. However, these risks are essentially the same as those of conventional monetary easing episodes in the pre-crisis period. To accurately gauge the effects, we use the surprise component of policy announcements. This is because the expected element should not affect market prices at the time of announcement as it should be already priced in. In particular, in the benchmark regressions, we use the change in the oneyear-ahead three-month futures rates as the surprise measure, so as to capture both the contemporaneous part of a monetary policy announcement (reflected in the target policy rate change) and any expected developments for near-term future rates (focus of the forward guidance and quantitative easing).
However, this standard measure of monetary policy surprise may also reflect the expected effect on one-year-ahead rates of today's policy. Besides, downward changes are potentially limited once the policy rate hits the zero lower bound. As an alternative, we thus construct a novel instrument for the surprise based on the number of news articles before and after each policy announcement. This measure is not constrained by the zero lower bound. The instrumental variable estimates confirm the negative effect of monetary easing on bank credit risk.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to provide a comprehensive assessment of the effects of unconventional monetary policies on the soundness of the banking sector.
While the empirical literature on unconventional monetary policy has been growing, most studies focus either on the transmission question, i.e., the effects of unconventional policies on long-term government bond yields and risky asset prices, or on the macroeconomic question, i.e., the effects on inflation and GDP growth rate (see review papers, for example, Woodford, 2012, and IMF, 2013b) .
A few papers have examined the relationship between monetary policy and bank risk-taking but primarily over the pre-crisis period. Altunbas, Gambacorta, and Marqués-Ibáñez (2010) found evidence that low interest rates over an extended period of time contributed to an increase in banks' risk, measured by their expected default frequency, over the pre-crisis period 1999-2008. Using data on U.S. banks' corporate loan ratings over a longer period that includes the first years of the crisis (1997 ), Dell'Ariccia, Laeven, and Suarez (2013 also found a negative relationship between risk-taking by banks and increases in real policy rates. The strength of that relationship depends on banks' capitalization and the effect of interest rates on risk-taking is smaller for poorly capitalized banks. Similar results were obtained by Jiménez, Ongena, Peydrò and Saurina (2009) A recent paper by English, Van den Heuvel, and Zakrajšek (2012) is most similar to our study. Using pre-crisis period data, they study the effects of changes in the level of policy rates and the slope of the yield curve on bank stock valuations and profitability. They show a drop in bank stock prices following an unexpected increase in the level of policy rates and a steepening of the yield curve. Although higher short-term rates and a steeper yield curve increase banks' return on assets, the positive effect on near-term profitability is offset by a slowdown in asset growth and an outflow of core deposits, which represent an inexpensive source of funding compared to market alternatives. Yet a policy rate cut is typically associated with a steepening of the yield curve. This is consistent with the assumption that monetary easing is effective at boosting economic activity, which should increase inflation and growth expectations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses and defines measures of monetary policy surprises. Section III reports the regression results using the U.S. market index data. Section IV presents the results of the robustness analysis, including the results for the euro area and the United Kingdom based on the market index, and for the United States based on bank-level data. Section V concludes.
II. SURPRISE COMPONENT OF MONETARY POLICY ANNOUNCEMENTS
We compare the average effects on banks of unconventional monetary policies with those of conventional monetary policies. We do so by regressing daily bank stock returns and daily A difficulty in conducting an event study on monetary policy is that the expected actions are already priced into asset prices at the time of the policy announcement. In other words, only the surprise component of an announcement can affect asset prices. Yet, in the conventional policy period, when the interest rate is the only policy tool, once the impact of one unit (e.g., one basis point) of surprise is estimated, the overall impact of the total policy rate change (e.g., 25 basis point cut) can be calculated simply by multiplying the coefficient by the total policy rate change (e.g., 25 times the estimated coefficient). Unfortunately, a similar estimate for the overall effect by an unconventional policy is difficult to obtain, as unconventional policy measures do not take the form of a change in the policy rate. Instead, we investigate whether the effects of unconventional policies differ in terms of signs and magnitude for one unit of surprise from those of conventional policies.
To compare the results, it is essential to gauge the surprise component for both conventional and unconventional monetary policy actions in a similar way. For conventional policies, Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) and Kuttner (2001) used daily changes in the 30-day federal funds futures contract rate as a measure of the surprise element of a monetary policy action for the United States. However, mirroring the behavior of the federal funds rate, the federal funds futures rate has been near zero and moving very little since late-2009. Moreover, the zero lower bound on short-term interest rates has caused central banks to target interest rates on longer-term securities as well as riskier assets.
As our benchmark surprise measure we use one-year-ahead futures of the three-month Eurodollar rate. This is because the one-year-ahead futures rate is less affected by the zero lower bound than the current-month futures contract rate and also because it relates more to the unconventional monetary policy's intention to influence longer-term interest rates.
Moreover, even in conventional times, changes in the one-year-ahead futures contract rate reflect not only the target policy rate changes but also implicit forward guidance on future economic conditions and future policy rates implied by the FOMC statements, which is an important part of monetary policy (Gürkanyak, Sack, and Swanson, 2005, and Campbell, Evans, Fisher and Justiniano, 2012) .
We acknowledge that the change in the one-year-ahead three-month Eurodollar futures rate is not a perfect measure of monetary policy surprises. First, rate changes are also constrained by the zero lower bound in later years, even though unconventional policy measures such as quantitative easing may not be constrained. In this case, the measured surprise can be smaller than the true surprise, and this would create an upward bias in the estimated magnitude of the effects of surprise. Second, a bold monetary easing action by the Fed, especially in the acute crisis phase, may be also seen as signaling a pessimistic view about the economy, and the market may accordingly revise its own assessment of economic growth downward. In this case, the oneyear-ahead futures rate would decline more than in the absence of such unintentional signals. 3 However, the direction of the overall bias is unclear because the opposite case is also possible (i.e., a less-than-expected action may signal that the Fed holds an optimistic view).
In addition to the measurement issues, endogeneity problems may also arise in the regression when using the one-year-ahead futures rate. The one-year-ahead futures rate reflects expectations of economic conditions a year later, which are influenced by current monetary 3 Such unintentional signals would also affect other asset prices. Thus, any change in the expectations of future credit risks due to current monetary policy is also reflected in the change in the one-year-ahead Eurodollar futures rate.
In this case, if the current policy rate cut is effective at lowering credit risks, the movements in the one-year-ahead futures rate may be even larger. We expanded Rosa's approach and counted the number of news articles on monetary policy three days before and after each policy announcement (total news coverage) using Factiva, which is a news-article search service provided by the Dow Jones company. We also collected the numbers of "positive" and "negative" news references in terms of monetary easing.
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These three variables, specifically, the before-after changes in total, positive, and negative news coverage, are used as instruments to avoid the endogeneity issues discussed above. Unlike Rosa's measure, our surprise measure does not involve a judgment call by the researcher. Figure 2 shows the plot of the fitted surprise measure constructed from the first stage regression of a two stage least squares estimation.
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Note that the movements of the fitted surprise are no longer constrained by the zero-lower bound in the later period unlike the changes in the one-year-ahead three-month Eurodollar futures rates (shown in Figure 1 ). In this sense, our two stage least squares strategy addresses not only the endogeneity problem but also corrects a possible bias due to the zero lower bound.
There is still a caveat. The number of news articles used as an instrument for the monetary policy surprise may increase just because unconventional monetary policy is newsworthy and not because of a surprise related to monetary policy easing or tightening. However, because many unconventional policies were already discussed and announced (for example, in speeches) before actual FOMC meetings and we only use FOMC episodes (with just two exceptions), the potential bias stemming from the novelty of the policy tools should be small.
Indeed, the mean and the variance of our fitted surprise measure in Figure 2 are more or less the same during the conventional policy period and the unconventional policy period. 
III. BENCHMARK REGRESSIONS
We run simple regressions for key bank-related asset prices based on our sample of monetary policy decision dates in the spirit of Bernanke and Kuttner (2005 By including a dummy variable for unconventional policy announcements, we allow for possible differences in the level effect (that is, the constant term) and the marginal effect (that is, the coefficient on surprise) between conventional and unconventional monetary policy announcements:
where the subscript z corresponds to each FOMC announcement and UMPdummy takes value one for announcements during the unconventional policy period and zero otherwise.
Unscheduled meetings are included in our sample of events but speeches (outside FOMC meetings) are in general excluded to ensure consistency as well as to contain any biases that might arise from pooling different types of events.
We are interested in the overall average effects of monetary policy announcements and thus use as many policy announcement events as possible. This is in contrast to most previous studies on unconventional monetary policy which focus only on a few events and look at asset prices movements for each event separately. In particular, we include FOMC days in which there was no policy change. This is because the surprise component can be negative or positive depending on market expectations before the FOMC meeting, even if no change in monetary policy was announced. Note that in these events without any policy changes, the expectations for the use of some specific policy tool (like asset purchases or forward The first column of Table 2 shows the effect of conventional monetary policy surprises on bank stock daily returns. It is insignificant. Similarly, the simple average effect of monetary policy surprises in both conventional and unconventional policy periods (second column) is not significant. The third column shows the results for the full specification, allowing different constant terms and coefficients for both the conventional and unconventional monetary policy periods. Again, no significant result arises. This finding is consistent with previous studies. Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) reports positive effects of surprise policy rate cuts on the market-wide stock index. However, as already discussed, a policy rate cut typically steepens the yield curve. Considering the positive effect of the policy rate cut and the negative effect from a steepened yield curve found in English, et al. (2012) , the overall effect is ambiguous and we interpret our results in this light.
However, we found negative, significant effects of monetary easing on bank credit risk measured by the daily changes in the spread between the bank corporate bond yields and the Treasury bond yields for the similar maturities (Table 2 , columns 4 to 12). For all maturities, an increase of about 0.08 basis point (bp) in spreads is observed for any unit of monetary easing surprise.
On the basis of the monetary easing events only, the effect of monetary surprises is found to be slightly lower than the one found in the benchmark regression (results omitted). Note that all episodes in the unconventional policy period are defined as monetary easing episodes. As for the conventional policy period, an FOMC announcement is classified as an easing episode if the expected change in the one-year-ahead futures rate is negative. The expected change is defined as the actual change in policy rates minus the surprise change. Table 3 shows the results using our news-based surprise measures as instruments in two stage least squares (TSLS) regressions. Specifically, in the first stage, logarithms of the beforeafter ratios of the number of total news, positive news, and negative news references are used as three regressors, substituting for the one-year-ahead three-month Eurodollar futures rate.
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Then, the fitted value is used as our Surprise variable in the key regression (1). The reported standard errors account for the two stage least squares estimation. To avoid any bias which may stem from the ambiguity in the search terms used to identify "positive" or "negative" surprises, we only consider monetary easing episodes in the conventional policy period and the whole sample of events in the unconventional period.
The results are broadly consistent with those of the benchmark regressions. Monetary policy easing surprises are associated with a deterioration of bank credit risk at the 1-3 year and 3-5 year maturities, but statistical significance is lost for the longer, 5-7 year, maturity. Again, we do not find any significant effect on bank stock returns.
IV. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS A. Sample Selection and Effects over Time
The results are robust to changes in the sample of events (taking out observations when the surprise measure exceeds its sample mean by more than two-standard deviations) and to alternative definitions of the conventional and unconventional monetary policy periods (results omitted).
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As an additional robustness check, it is, however interesting to investigate whether the effects of unconventional policies have changed over time after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. profitability and soundness and the results are similar to those of the benchmark regressions.
In summary, unconventional policies do not have robust specific effects, as those effects differ depending on the year (and surely depending on each event). However, the common effects of both conventional and unconventional monetary policies on bank credit risk remain significant over all sample years.
B. Euro Area and the United Kingdom
A natural question is whether the effects of monetary policy are different in other countries.
To answer this question, we estimated similar regressions for the euro area (Table 5a ) and the United Kingdom (Table 5b ). As regards bank credit risk, the regression results show similar results to the ones obtained for the United States in that monetary easing surprises appear to cause a deterioration of bank credit risk. The magnitude of the effect for the United Kingdom is similar to that for the United States, while the magnitude for the euro area is about twice as large. In addition, for the euro area and the United Kingdom, bank stock prices fall with monetary easing, an effect not observed in the United States. Again, most of these effects are common to both conventional and unconventional policies.
The results from the two stage least squares estimation are a bit weaker. Like in the United
States, we do not find a significant effect of monetary policy on bank stock returns. Credit risk in the euro area still deteriorates, while the effect is not significant anymore in the United Kingdom (results omitted).
C. U.S. Bank-level Regressions
This section examines whether the effects of monetary policy on bank stock returns and credit risk vary with individual bank characteristics such as asset size and capitalization. We use quarterly balance sheet data (i.e., total assets and the equity/assets ratio) for a balanced sample of 88 U.S. banks from the SNL Financial database.
14 Total assets are divided by GDP to ensure stationarity. The variables are lagged by one quarter and then used as the additional controls in the regression. We also include interaction terms with the surprise measure and the unconventional monetary policy dummy. Note that bank balance sheet data are quarterly while monetary policy announcements typically occur once a month. To control for differences in the information content of balance sheet variables in different months within a quarter, we include a dummy variable for the first month of each quarter (Mon1 dummy) and another dummy variable for the second month of each quarter (Mon2 dummy).
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The following equation is estimated with bank fixed effects.
14 The database is provided commercially by SNL Financial. Data availability issues prevent us from conducting the same analysis for the euro area and the United Kingdom.
15 Mon1 dummy takes the value one if the month of a monetary policy announcement is January, April, July, or October, and zero otherwise. Mon2 dummy takes the value one if the month of a monetary policy announcement is February, May, August, or November, and zero otherwise. These dummies are usually significant in the regressions. 
where subscript z denotes a FOMC announcement and i refers to a bank. Table 6 shows the results. 16 We are in particular interested in the coefficients on the Surprise measure and its interactions. Results from the fixed effect estimation are shown in columns 1 to 5 and those from two-stage-least-squares estimation where we use our news variable are shown in columns 6 to 10.
The results generally support the benchmark regression results-little effect of monetary easing on bank stocks. Conventional monetary policy surprises have no effect on bank stock returns (column 1) though unconventional monetary easing has a positive effect (γ 5 , around 0.08). Moreover, this effect is larger for larger banks (γ 12, around 0.001). These effects come out strongly only in the third year after the collapse of Lehman Brothers (column 4).
However, TSLS regressions indicate that these effects disappear once the endogeneity problems and the measurement problems introduced by the zero-lower-bound are accounted for by use of the news-based surprise variable. 16 The coefficient estimates for the bank fixed effects, Mon1 and Mon2 dummies, and the constant term are not reported. The use of a balanced panel potentially introduces a survivorship bias and may lead to underestimating the coefficients as banks which exited the sample following a bankruptcy, a merger or a takeover may have experienced larger movements in their stock prices. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at bank level. 
V. CONCLUSION
We examined the effects of unconventional monetary policy on banking sector soundness.
We could not find clear supporting evidence for the common conception that unconventional monetary policy helped banks. Rather, we find some evidence for heightened medium-term risks. Specifically, using a novel instrument for monetary policy surprise, we find robust evidence that unexpected monetary policy easing tends to increase bank medium-term credit risk in the United States, the euro area, and the United Kingdom. However, such financial stability risks by unconventional policies appear essentially the same as the risks stemming from conventional monetary easing.
A caveat is that the crisis-period data may require analysis based on non-linear counterfactuals. We implicitly examine whether the effects are different from zero, but the potential negative paths that the economy may take could be much larger without the support of the unconventional monetary policy. Further technical developments are warranted to address this issue when analyzing crisis-period data. The dependent variable is either the daily bank stock return (%) or the daily change in yield spread (bp) between bank corporate bonds and Treasury bonds with the similar maturity. The events are FOMC announcements between January 2000 and October 2012, except for September 12, 2001. Also, two Jackson Hole speech dates are added for 2010 and 2012. The regressors are: Surprise, which denotes for the daily change in one-year ahead three-month Eurodollar futures rate; UMP dummy, which takes the value one for the unconventional policy period (defined in the row just above the column numbers); and the interaction term, Surprise * UMP dummy. T-statistics are presented in parenthesis based on robust standard errors: * denotes significance at the 10 percent threshold, ** at 5 percent, and *** at 1 percent. The dependent variable is either the daily bank stock return (%) or the daily change in yield spread (bp) between bank corporate bonds and Treasury bonds with the similar maturity. The events are FOMC announcements between January 2000 and October 2012, except for September 12, 2001. Also, two Jackson Hole speech dates are added for 2010 and 2012. In the conventional period, only monetary easing episodes are used. The regressors are: Surprise, which is fitted value based on the first-stage regression of the daily change in one-year ahead three-month Eurodollar futures rate on the logarithms of after-before ratio of number of total news, positive news, and negative news (see text); UMP dummy, which takes the value one for the unconventional policy period (defined in the row just above the column numbers); and the interaction term, Surprise * UMP dummy. T-statistics are presented in parenthesis based on robust standard errors: * denotes significance at the 10 percent threshold, ** at 5 percent, and *** at 1 percent. The dependent variable is either the daily bank stock return (%) or the daily change in yield spread (bp) between bank corporate bonds and Treasury bonds with the similar maturity. The events are monetary policy official announcements between January 2000 and October 2012. The regressors are: Surprise, which denotes for the daily change in one-year ahead three-month Euribor futures rate; UMP dummy, which takes value one for the unconventional policy period (defined in the row just above the column numbers); and the interaction term, Surprise * UMP dummy. T-statistics are presented in parenthesis based on robust standard errors: * denotes significance at the 10 percent threshold, ** at 5 percent, and *** at 1 percent.
Sample period for conventional policy (UMP dummy = 0) The dependent variable is either the daily bank stock return (%) or the daily change in yield spread (bp) between bank corporate bonds and Treasury bonds with the similar maturity. The events are monetary policy official announcements between January 2000 and October 2012. The regressors are: Surprise, which denotes for the daily change in one-year ahead three-month Sterling futures rate; UMP dummy, which takes value one for the unconventional policy period (defined in the row just above the column numbers); and the interaction term, Surprise * UMP dummy. T-statistics are presented in parenthesis based on robust standard errors: * denotes significance at the 10 percent threshold, ** at 5 percent, and *** at 1 percent. -5) ; or, for the two stage least square specifications (columns 6-10), Surprise is the fitted value based on the first-stage regression of the daily change in one-year ahead three-month Eurodollar futures rate on the logarithms of afterbefore ratio of number of total news, positive news, and negative news (see text); UMP dummy, which takes the value one for the unconventional policy period (defined in the row just above the column numbers); and the interaction term, Surprise * UMP dummy. Coefficients for the level controls are not reported: bank fixed effects, constant, dummy for the first month in each quarter, and the dummy for the second month in each quarter. The bank-level regressors are: Lagged Asset/GDP ratio, Lagged Equity/Asset Ratio, and interaction terms between these bank-level variables and Surprise as well as UMP dummy.
Triple interaction terms are also included. T-statistics are presented in parenthesis based on robust standard errors clustered at bank level: * denotes significance at the 10 percent threshold, ** at 5 percent, and *** at 1 percent.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) The dependent variable is the daily change in CDS spread (bp) for each bank. Events are FOMC announcements after September 16, 2008 , until October 2012 . Two Jackson Hole speech dates are added for 2010 and 2012. The aggregate regressor is Surprise, which is the fitted value based on the first-stage regression of the daily change in one-year ahead threemonth Eurodollar futures rate on the logarithms of after-before ratio of number of total news, positive news, and negative news (see text). The coefficients for the level controls are not reported: constant, dummy for the first month in each quarter, and the dummy for the second month in each quarter. The bank-level regressors are: Lagged Asset/GDP ratio, Lagged Equity/Asset Ratio, and interaction terms between these bank-level variables and Surprise. Tstatistics are presented in parenthesis based on robust standard errors: * denotes significance at the 10 percent threshold, ** at 5 percent, and *** at 1 percent. 
